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The purpose of this article is to provide a comprehensive analysis into 
the judicial philosophies of the newest Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court, Neil Gorsuch.
1
 In this way, the article may serve practitioners and 
legal scholars alike with a means to predict the outcome of future Supreme 
Court cases concerning energy and environmental law. 
The article breaks into three main sections. Broken into three subparts, 
Part I provides not only insight into Gorsuch’s pre-confirmation life but 
also discussion on his: (1) Early Life and Education, (2) Early Legal Career, 
and (3) Personal Life. Part II, “Gorsuch’s Philosophies Applied to Energy 
and Environmental Law Cases,” overviews Gorsuch’s prominent judicial 
philosophies followed by a series of Gorsuch-authored, case analyses. 
Every analysis identifies the judicial philosophy Gorsuch uses and how that 
philosophy affects the outcome. Divided in two subparts—“Energy Law” 
and “Environmental Law”—the cases discussed fall within one of these two 
categories. Finally, Part III, “Gorsuch v. Scalia—On Chevron and 
Standing,” compares the two justices and details how their differences 
affect the future of the court and the industry. 
I. Who is Neil Gorsuch? 
A. Early Life and Education 
Neil McGill Gorsuch was born in Denver, Colorado on August 29, 
1967.
2
 He attended grade school at Christ the King, a K-12 Catholic school, 
where he learned the importance of moral character and service.
3
 Gorsuch, 
according to his classmates and teachers, seemed to internalize this 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as Supreme 
Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-
supreme-court.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2018). 
 2. Neil Gorsuch, INSIDEGOV, http://supreme-court-justices.insidegov.com/l/113/Neil-
Gorsuch#References&s=ref (last visited Dec. 18, 2017). 
 3. Kimberly Kindy, Sari Horwitz, & William Wan, Simply stated, Gorsuch is steadfast 
and surprising, WASH. POST, (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
graphics/politics/gorsuch-profile/.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/8
2018] Neil Gorsuch: On Energy & Environmental Law 1495 
 
 
importance in ways unlike many other kids his age.
4
 One of Gorsuch’s 
closest childhood friends, Jonathan Brody, recalled a time when this 
character shined.
5
 Apparently, Gorsuch damaged a sleeping bag he 
borrowed from Brody to use at a sleepover one night.
6
 Gorsuch was 
distraught because he felt that his integrity was put into question.
7
 Brody 
remembered this intense form of self-reflection, and subsequently found 
himself questioning whether he took the importance of character “seriously 
enough.”8  
In somewhat of a contrast, Gorsuch’s parents, Anne and David, both of 
whom were lawyers, taught their children from an early age the “art of 
verbal sparring.”9 Family debates could ignite anywhere and everywhere—
about anything and everything.
10
 Gorsuch’s younger brother, J.J., said that 
during these bouts their parents would encourage them to consider the 
rationality of both arguments before forming their conclusions.
11
 This 
lesson, according to J.J., taught the brothers that “the truth is often 
[somewhere] in the middle.”12 No doubt, a good lesson for a young 
Gorsuch destined to reach the highest court.  
Anne Gorsuch was the politician of the family, successfully campaigning 
for the Colorado state legislature in 1976,
13
 and later, to her appointment by 
President Reagan as the first, female Administrator of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency.
14
 After her appointment, Anne moved 
the kids to Washington D.C. and enrolled Gorsuch at Georgetown 
Preparatory School.
15
 While Anne Gorsuch was busy cutting the agency’s 
budget by twenty-two percent, Neil Gorsuch was championing Reagan 
conservatism in every way he could.
16
 His stance was so well-known that 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Sara Clarke, 10 Things You Didn’t Know About Neil Gorsuch, U.S. NEWS, (Jan. 31, 
2017, 8:18 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2017-01-31/10-
things-you-didnt-know-about-neil-gorsuch. 
 15. Who We Are, Alumni, Notable Alumni, GEORGETOWN PREPARATORY SCHOOL, 
http://www.gprep.org/about/alumni/notable-alumni (last visited Dec. 18, 2017). 
 16. Kindy, supra note 3. 
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an entry to his high school yearbook labeled him the “founder of the 
‘Fascism Forever Club.’”17 Unfortunately for the Gorsuch family, during 
Neil’s sophomore year, Congress grew concerned that Anne was 
mismanaging a toxic waste Superfund program, and after she denied their 
request for documents about the investigation, held her in contempt.
18
 After 
only twenty-two months as administrator, Anne Gorsuch resigned.
19
 
Though Gorsuch struggled with the news of his mother’s resignation, he 
remained enrolled and later served as a United States Senate Page and 
became a national champion in debating,
20
 until graduating in 1985.
21
  
After high school, Gorsuch attended Columbia University where he 
received a degree in political science and was inducted into Phi Beta 
Kappa, a collegiate honors society.
22
 As a freshman, Gorsuch co-founded 
“The Fed,” a newspaper inspired by two Columbia alumni, and authors of 
the original Federalist Papers, John Jay and Alexander Hamilton.
23
 In their 
first issue, Gorsuch and his counterparts explained their mission: “Our 
voice will be an aggressive but considered one, one that may make you 
think or may just make you angry. But it will be heard, and it will not be 
shouted down.”24  
After terrorizing the liberals on campus with his fiery editorial comments 
at Columbia, Gorsuch traveled to Boston to begin his legal training at 
Harvard Law School. While at Harvard, Gorsuch participated in the 
Harvard Prison Legal Assistance Project and the Harvard Defenders 
program.
25
 He also served as an editor of the Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy.
26
 Ken Mehlman, Gorsuch’s housemate who later became 
chairman of the Republican National Committee, said that Gorsuch was 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Marina Cassio, Predicting How a “Justice” Gorsuch Would Impact Environmental 
Law, MARTEN LAW, (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20170404-
justice-gorsuch-environmental-law. 
 20. Kindy, supra note 3. 
 21. Who We Are, supra note 15. 
 22. Clarke, supra note 14. 
 23. Kindy, supra note 3. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Clarke, supra note 14.  
 26. Neil M. Gorsuch ’91 nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court, HARV. L. TODAY, (Jan. 
31, 2017) https://today.law.harvard.edu/president-trump-nominates-neil-m-gorsuch-91-u-s-
supreme-court/.  
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unlike many of the other Harvard students in that he cared about others and 
what they were saying.
27
 He graduated cum laude in 1991.
28
  
Only upon the final leg of his education, Gorsuch begins to distinguish 
himself from the other justices on the bench. After serving as a judicial 
clerk for Judge David B. Sentelle on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit,  Gorsuch attended Oxford as a Marshall Scholar, performing 
research on assisted suicide and euthanasia under the supervision of 
acclaimed “natural law” scholar and theorist, John Finnis.29 In his 
dissertation, later published as a book entitled, “The Future of Assisted 
Suicide and Euthanasia,” Gorsuch advocates against assisted suicide, 
opining that the “intentional taking of human life by private persons is 
always wrong.”30 In Oxford, Gorsuch met and married his wife, Louise, a 
champion equestrian on the Oxford riding team.
31
  
B. Early Legal Career 
1. Clerkships 
As mentioned previously, Justice Gorsuch clerked for Judge David 
Sentelle on the D.C. Circuit immediately after graduating from Harvard.
32
 
After earning his doctorate at Oxford, Gorsuch returned to the States and 
clerked for Supreme Court Justices Byron White and Anthony Kennedy 
from 1993 to 1994.
33
 Justice White hired Gorsuch but retired part-way 
through his clerkship.
34
 Interestingly, Gorsuch and White are the only 
Coloradans to sit on the high court.
35
 Perhaps even more interesting, 
because Kennedy is still active on the bench, Gorsuch is the first Justice to 
decide cases alongside a Justice he previously clerked under.
36
  
                                                                                                                 
 27. Kindy, supra note 3. 
 28. Hon. Neil Gorsuch, THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y, https://fedsoc.org/contributors/neil-
gorsuch (last visited Dec. 18, 2017). 
 29. J. Paul Kelleher, Neil Gorsuch’s “natural law” philosophy is a long way from 
Justice Scalia’s originalism, VOX, (Mar. 20, 2017, 8:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-
idea/2017/3/20/14976926/gorsuch-natural-law-supreme-court-hearings. 
 30. Clarke, supra note 14.  
 31. Kindy, supra note 3. 
 32. Gorsuch ’91, supra note 26.  
 33. Cassio, supra note 19. 
 34. Ephrat Livni, Neil Gorsuch is the first US Supreme Court justice to sit on the bench 
with his high court boss, QUARTZ, (Apr. 7, 2017), https://qz.com/953345/neil-gorsuch-is-the-
first-us-supreme-court-justice-to-sit-on-the-bench-with-his-high-court-boss/. 
 35. Cassio, supra note 19. 
 36. Livni, supra note 34. 
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2. Private Law  
Instead of joining an established firm, Gorsuch took a riskier route with a 
two-year-old, firm out of Washington—Kellogg, Huber, Hansen & Todd—
working closely with one of the firm’s partners and leading trial lawyers, 
Mark Hansen.
37
 The two became close, and Hansen later stated that the 
inherent risk of losing in litigation “pushed” Gorsuch to become a better 
litigator and that Gorsuch’s Midwestern way of talking gave Gorsuch a 
natural edge when communicating to a jury.
38
 He displayed this effect 
during his first trial as a lead attorney. After the jury read the verdict in 
favor of Gorsuch’s client, a juror ran up to Gorsuch and compared him to 
Perry Mason.
39
 Gorsuch became partner in 1998 and remained a partner 
until leaving the firm to work for President Bush’s Justice Department in 
2005.
40
  
3. Department of Justice 
Justice Gorsuch served as Principal Deputy to the Associate Attorney 
General, Robert McCallum, at the Department of Justice from 2005-2006 
before being tapped by Bush to become a federal appellate court judge.
41
 As 
Principal Deputy, Gorsuch assisted in managing the Department’s civil 
litigation components.
42
 He also handled all terror litigation arising from the 
War on Terror.
43
 
C. Personal Life 
Justice Gorsuch is a family man, an outdoorsman, and a Westerner.
44
 He 
lives in “unincorporated Boulder County, in a mountain-view community 
on a property with several horses” with his wife, Louis, and his two 
daughters, Emma and Belinda.
45
 He is a black diamond skier,
46
 an avid fly-
                                                                                                                 
 37. Kindy, supra note 3. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Gorsuch ’91, supra note 26. 
 42. 152 Cong. Rec. S15346 (daily ed. July 20, 2006). 
 43. Charlie Savage, Newly Public Emails Hint at Gorsuch’s View of Presidential 
Power, N.Y. TIMES, (March 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/us/politics/ 
supreme-court-nominee-neil-gorsuch-bush-era.html. 
 44. Adam Liptak, In Judge Neil Gorsuch, an Echo of Scalia in Philosophy and Style, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-
supreme-court-nominee.html. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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fisherman,
47
 and hosts regular picnics for his former law clerks.
48
 He is 
famous for beginning an opinion with the statement, “Everyone enjoys a 
trip to the mountains in the summertime.”49 In addition to all of that, 
Gorsuch enjoys rowing, running, and reading.
50
 On the second day of 
confirmation hearings, in fact, Gorsuch said that he loves good fiction, and 
that “if you want to learn to write you must learn to read.”51 Until 
confirmation, Gorsuch taught legal ethics at the University of Colorado 
Law School.
52
 
II. Gorsuch’s Philosophies Applied to Energy 
and Environmental Law Cases   
Judges use judicial philosophy to help them understand, interpret, and 
rule on legal issues. Justice Gorsuch is no different. Like Scalia and many 
other conservative jurists, Gorsuch is a “textualist” when interpreting 
statutes and common, judge-made law
53
 and an “originalist” when 
interpreting the U.S. Constitution.
54
 Textualists believe that interpretation of 
law should focus solely on the written language in the law, ignoring intent 
in the process.
55
 At a lecture delivered to the Case Western Law School in 
honor of Scalia, Gorsuch declared that a textualist should:  
[S]trive to apply the law as it is, focusing backward, not forward, 
and looking to text, structure, and history to decide what a 
reasonable reader at the time of the events in question would 
have understood the law to be—not to decide cases based on 
their own moral convictions or the policy consequences they 
believe might serve society best.
56
  
                                                                                                                 
 47. Ariane de Vogue, Meet Neil Gorsuch: A fly-fishing Scalia fan, CNN, (Feb. 1, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/31/politics/neil-gorsuch-antonin-scalia/index.html. 
 48. Liptak, supra note 44. 
 49. Scherer v. U.S. Forest Serv., 653 F.3d 1241, 1242 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 50. Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing, Day 2, Part 2, C-SPAN, https://www.c-
span.org/video/?425138-101/gorsuch-confirmation-hearing-day-2-part-2 (last visited Mar. 3, 
2018). 
 51. Id.  
 52. de Vogue, supra note 47. 
 53. Cassio, supra note 19. 
 54. Kindy, supra note 3. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the 
Legacy of Justice Scalia, 2016 Sumner Canary Lecture at Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law (Apr. 7, 2016), in 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 909 (2016).  
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Scalia, a textualist in his own regard, was also a pioneer of Originalism, 
explaining “[t]he Constitution that I interpret and apply is not living but 
dead, or as I prefer to call it, enduring. It means today not what current 
society, much less the court, thinks it ought to mean, but what it meant 
when it was adopted.”57 In other words, Originalists interpret the words of 
the U.S. Constitution as they were understood by its authors when they 
were written.  
Unlike Scalia, Gorsuch employs a third—natural law—philosophy if the 
first two, textualism and originalism, are inapplicable or lacking. This 
typically occurs when a law is inconclusive, and past precedent cannot 
rectify the issue.
58
 Jurists who embrace a natural law theory believe that 
judges should consider the morality of a particular law instead of 
constraining themselves solely to conventional legal materials.
59
 Gorsuch 
adopted this third approach while researching and writing his dissertation in 
Oxford under the acclaimed natural law jurist, John Finnis.
60
 It is important 
to note that the only areas of law where Gorsuch has openly advocated for 
natural law is assisted suicide and euthanasia.
61
 Further, any environmental 
or energy law case Gorsuch would face could likely be rectified by either 
textualism or originalism thus taking natural law out of consideration. It is 
still worth noting, however, that if it came down to it, and Gorsuch needed 
to resort to other canons of decision making, it would not be surprising to 
see his natural law beliefs on center stage. Additional differences between 
Gorsuch and Scalia are discussed in detail in Section III.
62
 The following 
sections contain case illustrations and analyses which showcase how these 
philosophies guide Gorsuch’s decision making when he faces energy and 
environmental law questions.  
A. Energy Law 
1. Energy and Environmental Legal Institute v. Epel 
Illustration. Coloradans passed an energy mandate requiring electricity 
generators to ensure that twenty percent of the electricity they sell to 
                                                                                                                 
 57. NPR staff, Originalism: A Primer On Scalia’s Constitutional Philosophy, NPR, 
(Feb. 14, 2016, 5:41 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/02/14/466744465/originalism-a-
primer-on-scalias-constitutional-philosophy. 
 58. Kelleher, supra note 29. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See infra Section III: “Gorsuch v. Scalia—On Chevron and Standing.” 
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Colorado consumers comes from renewable sources.
63
 The Energy and 
Environment Legal Institute (“EELI”), a non-profit organization that 
represents coal producers, brought suit against the Commissioners of the 
Colorado Public Utilities alleging that “because Colorado is a net importer 
of electricity” and is part of a large electrical grid connecting several states, 
the new mandate causes out-of-state producers to “lose business with out-
of-state utilities who feed their power onto the grid.”64 This harm, EELI 
argued, violated one of the three branches of dormant commerce clause 
jurisprudence.
65
 
Gorsuch telegraphed the outcome in the very first sentence when he 
questioned, “Can Colorado’s renewable energy mandate survive an 
encounter with the most dormant doctrine in dormant commerce clause 
jurisprudence?”66 The answer, of course, was yes. “Detractors find dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine absent from the Constitution’s text and 
incompatible with its structure,” Gorsuch wrote, citing dissents by Justices 
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
67
 Continuing, he concluded, 
“whatever doctrinal pigeonhole you choose to place them in68. . . [none] 
require us to strike down Colorado’s mandate . . . [f]or that mandate . . . 
isn’t a price control statute, it doesn’t link prices paid in Colorado with 
those paid out of state, and it does not discriminate against out-of-staters.”69  
Analysis. This case is influential not just for Colorado regulatory 
authorities, the renewable energy sector, and the citizens of Colorado whom 
voted and passed this referendum, but also for every state which followed 
Colorado’s lead by creating similar renewable initiatives. Had the mandate 
been struck down, other state mandates in style similar would have been in 
jeopardy.
70
 As such, this case is often regarded as Gorsuch’s most 
significant decision in the regulatory area,
71
 and it is a perfect example of 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Energy and Envtl. Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1170 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 64. Id. at 1171.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 1170.  
 67. Id. at 1171. 
 68. This referred to the three Supreme Court precedents used for dormant commerce 
clause challenges. 
 69. Epel, 793 F.3d at 1173.  
 70. Seth Jaffe, The 10th Circuit Affirms Colorado’s RPS; The Dormant Commerce 
Clause Remains Dormant, FOLEY HOAG LLP (July 15, 2015), http://www.lawand 
environment.com/2015/07/15/the-10th-circuit-affirms-colorados-rps-the-dormant-
commerce-clause-remains-dormant/. 
 71. Dan Farber, Gorsuch and the Environment: A Closer Look, LEGAL PLANET, (Mar. 
20, 2017), http://legal-planet.org/2017/03/20/gorsuch-and-the-environment-a-deeper-dive/. 
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how his judicial philosophies interact with and could affect similar laws in 
the future. 
Gorsuch applied Originalism when denying the existence of the dormant 
commerce clause in this case. He cites to prior dissents from Justices Scalia 
and Thomas, remarking that the doctrine is absent from the Constitution’s 
text and is incompatible with its structure. According to Gorsuch and other 
Originalists like him, the dormant commerce clause does not exist simply 
because it is not found in the text of the Constitution. 
If Gorsuch maintains this position, the balance of the Supreme Court on 
this issue will not change. He shares the same anti-dormant-commerce-
clause belief with Scalia who was already the minority in that regard when 
he was on the bench. Therefore, unless another justice were to change their 
position, the dormant commerce clause is here to stay.  
Supreme Court precedent is binding upon federal courts
72
 and in this 
case, required Gorsuch to apply the dormant commerce clause test no 
matter how severely it pained him to do so. He used a textualist approach to 
interpret the dormant commerce clause doctrine and compare it to the 
Renewable Portfolio Standard in question. He then concluded that because 
the mandate was not a price controlling statute, the dormant commerce 
clause could not invalidate it. This is important because it demonstrates that 
no matter how badly he disagrees with a doctrine or result, if binding 
precedent it present, he will apply it accordingly. This opinion also shows 
that Gorsuch, much like Scalia, is not afraid of letting his opinion be known 
and heard. In that regard, the bench maintains that attitude, too.  
2. Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC 
Illustration. Entek GRB, LLC, a federal mineral lessee, (“Lessee”) sued 
Stull Ranches (“Landowner”) to secure access to a well located on surface 
estate owned by Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”).73 The “dispute 
arose when [Lessee] asked permission to enter [Landowner’s] surface 
estate—both to develop new oil well sites” on Landowner’s property and to 
gain access to “one of its existing wells located on an adjacent surface 
estate owned by [BLM.]”74 Importantly, the road across Landowner’s 
property was the only means of accessing BLM’s property.75 Worried that 
Lessee’s presence would disturb Landowner’s current hunting operations, 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Stare decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining stare decisis as: 
to stand by decided cases; to uphold precedents; to maintain former adjudications). 
 73. Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252, 1253 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
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Landowner refused access. Lessee sued in the District Court of Colorado.
76
 
The district court granted Lessee’s motion for summary judgment in part—
entitling them access to portions of Landowner’s surface to “mine certain 
leases lying below,” but denying their request to cross Landowner’s surface 
to service the adjacent well.
77
 Lessee appealed to the Tenth Circuit, wherein 
Judge Gorsuch delivered Lessee full relief.
78
  
Gorsuch held that because Landowner is the successor in interest to land 
grants provided under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 (“Act”), 
Lessee enjoys the right to use the already existing road on Landowner 
property to service the adjacent well, “rather than being forced to incur the 
waste of having to build a new and duplicative byway.”79 To reach this 
conclusion, Gorsuch interpreted the plain language of the Act and 
determined that the right to “reenter and occupy” as much of the surface as 
needed for purposes “reasonably incident” to the mining of mineral 
beneath, encompasses Lessee’s right to access the adjacent well via 
Landowner’s private road.80  
Analysis. Gorsuch employed a textualist approach to this problem, 
analyzing the plain language of a federal statute to hold for the operator in a 
leasing agreement. Importantly, Gorsuch did not reference the eternal 
policy struggle between the rights of private property owners and the 
interest the government has in regulating oil and gas production. Instead, he 
offered a straightforward approach to a legal issue and left all bias and 
leanings to the side. 
This type of decision is common for Gorsuch. Where he could address 
policy, he is often silent. As the later cases indicate, Gorsuch turns to the 
text before anything else and applies the law as it is instead of trying to 
mold the law to parallel any social policy.  
3. Lexington Insurance Co. v. Precision Drilling Co, L.P. 
Illustration. An individual was injured while working on an oil rig.
81
 The 
rig’s owner, Precision Drilling Company (“Owner”), paid the individual a 
settlement for his injuries and sought indemnification from Lexington 
Insurance Company (“Insurer”).82 Insurer admits that two insurance policies 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (emphasis added).  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1255–57.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Precision Drilling Co., 830 F.3d 1219, 1220 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 82. Id.  
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were issued and paid for by Owner to cover accidents like the one here, 
however, it argues that a Wyoming Anti-Indemnity Statute renders those 
policies a nullity and thus any coverage was illusory.
83
 Insurer brought 
action seeking declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to indemnify 
Owner.
84
 The District Court of Wyoming granted summary judgment for 
Insurer and Owner appealed.
85
 
 Gorsuch, writing for a Tenth Circuit majority, held for Owner and 
reversed and remanded.
86
 He began his opinion by stating that “Wyoming 
law usually prohibits those engaged in oil and gas productions from 
contractually shifting to others liability for their own negligence.”87 
However, as Gorsuch points out, the statute does not stop there.
88
 The next 
sentence provides that “[t]his provision shall not affect the validity of any 
insurance contract.”89 Even with this exception pointed out, Insurer argued 
that legislature intended only to benefit only the company that purchases 
the insurance policy, not third parties.
90
 Gorsuch disagreed, stating that “the 
best evidence of legislative intentions lies in the language the legislature 
actually adopted and the executive actually signed.”91 The statute in 
question, he continues, “expressly allow[s] enforcement of any insurance 
contract—and its choice to do something different than other states have 
done is a choice we as judges must honor, not undo.”92 As a last effort, 
Insurer claims that even if the court is not persuaded by its previous 
arguments, that Tenth Circuit precedent binds the court to rule in their 
favor.
93
 Gorsuch, again unpersuaded, showed that this precedent is 
unpublished, unbinding, and factually distinguishable.
94
  
Analysis. This case demonstrates perfectly how textual jurisprudence can 
smoothly and efficiently settle litigation. The word “any” as used in the 
statute plainly excludes from the Anti-Indemnity clause “any and all" 
insurance contracts, according to Gorsuch. Continuing, he denounced 
Insurer’s argument that the legislature intended a different result. In perfect 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. (emphasis added).  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.; see WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30–1–131(a)(iii)(B).  
 90. Id. (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. at 1221.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 1224.  
 94. Id.  
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textual form, Gorsuch reminded the worlds that the intent of the legislature 
is only required when ambiguity exists in a statute—not a problem in this 
case. On this point, Gorsuch quoted a prior decision from the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals: “‘[w]hen a statute is clear as a glass slipper and 
fits without strain,’ it is our job merely to put it on the foot where it 
belongs.”95 
B. Environmental Law 
1. Cook v. Rockwell International Corp.  
Illustration. Landowners filed a class action under the Price-Anderson 
Act, a federal statute providing for liability after nuclear incidents, and state 
tort law against Operators of a nuclear weapons manufacturing plant to 
recover for damages caused by releases of radioactive material from the 
plant.
96
 After a verdict in favor of Landowners, the District Court denied 
Operators’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for new trial, 
or, alternatively, for remitter of damages, and Operators appealed.
97
 The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
98
 reversed and remanded, determining that 
the jury instructions given by the District Court about what constitutes a 
nuclear incident were too permissive. On remand, the United States District 
Court for the District of Colorado
99
 entered judgment in Operators’ favor, 
and Landowners appealed.
100
  
 This time, the issue before Gorsuch and the Tenth Circuit was whether 
the Price-Anderson Act (“Act”) not only provides a federal forum when a 
nuclear incident is asserted but “also preempts and [thus] precludes any 
state law recovery where (as here) a nuclear incident is asserted but 
ultimately unproven.”101 In his decision, Gorsuch began by detailing how 
preemption may come about, the differences between various forms of 
preemptions, before finally determining that the only preemption argument 
at issue here is whether the Act “expressly” preempts Colorado tort law.102 
Gorsuch ruled against preemption and directed the trial court to enter 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. at 1220 (quoting Demko v. United States, 216 F.3d 1049, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  
 96. Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 790 F.3d 1088, 1090 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 1091; see Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F. 3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2010).  
 99. Cook, 790 F.3d at 1092; see Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 13 F. Supp. 3d 1153 (D. 
Colo. 2014).  
 100. Cook, 790 F.3d at 1092. 
 101. Id. (emphasis added). 
 102. Id.  
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judgment in favor of Landowners.
103
 He reasoned that preemption should 
generally be rejected when the law at issue concerns public health or safety 
and found nothing in the statute which preempted state tort law.
104
 Notably, 
Gorsuch nodded to a decision by the Fifth Circuit,
105
which took the 
opposite stance on the issue. 
Analysis. Cook serves as an illustration of how Gorsuch approaches 
preemption cases, a significant issue in environmental law because there is 
so much state and federal regulation in the industry. Unsurprisingly, he 
ignored what the Fifth Circuit had done and instead held that state tort law 
was not preempted and that the residents could consequently recover.
106
 
Gorsuch abstained from the application of field preemption, and looked 
instead to the precise text of the Price-Anderson Act and found nowhere in 
the language an expressed or even implied intent to preempt.
107
 
Importantly, Gorsuch determined that preemption is disfavored in areas 
where state law deals with public health and safety.
108
 This carve-out could 
be particularly important for state environmental laws.
109
 
Gorsuch differs from his Scalia slightly in this regard, given that his 
predecessor’s record in the area was somewhat shaky, with forceful 
opinions written both for and against the doctrine.
110
 He fully embraced 
preemption in specific political contexts but championed states’ rights in 
others.
111
 If Cook is an accurate example of Gorsuch’s philosophy of 
preemption, he could push the Court more solidly in the states’ rights 
direction.
112
 
2. Scherer v. U.S. Forest Service 
Illustration. Residents who used a recreational area sued the United 
States Forest Service, alleging that charging a standard fee for the 
recreational use of a recreational area violated the Federal Lands Recreation 
Enhancement Act
113
 (“REA”).114 The United States District Court for the 
District of Colorado found for Forest Service, and Residents appealed.
115
 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. at 1112.  
 104. Id. at 1094–95. 
 105. See Gibson v. Worley Mills, Inc., 620 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 106. Cassio, supra note 19. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 16 U.S.C. § 6802(f). 
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Gorsuch, writing for a 10th Circuit majority, affirmed.
116
 Because the 
plaintiff challenged the regulation as a whole, he could win only by 
showing that its every application was illegal, and that, according to 
Gorsuch, was simply not true.
117
 Gorsuch started with the plain text of the 
REA and found Congress authorized amenity fees in 2004 for parks—an 
exception, he noted, to the general rule that people can “enter this country’s 
great national forests free of charge.”118 He concluded that the Forest 
Service was acting within its statutory limitations when authorizing the fee 
because the area in issue offered amenities like a nature center and 
patrolling security guards to all visitors.
119
 “[I]t’s just not the case that every 
time the Forest Service collects the amenity fee it exceeds its statutory 
authority,” and for that reason, the facial challenge fails, Gorsuch wrote.120 
Analysis. This case illustrates Gorsuch’s appreciation for nature and the 
environment, a trait that was never seen from Scalia.
121
 Gorsuch became 
somewhat famous from the first line in Scherer, “Everyone enjoys a trip to 
the mountains in the summertime.”122 
3. Hydro Resources Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
Illustration. Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion on a petition for review 
heard en banc by the 10th Circuit regarding an Environmental Protection 
Agency decision to implement a pollution control program at a New 
Mexico uranium mine.
123
 The case turned on whether the EPA or the New 
Mexico Environment Department was responsible for issuing a necessary 
permit under the Safe Drinking Water Act
124
 given the mine’s proposal to 
use an underground injection system to extract uranium ore.
125
 The EPA 
determined that it had jurisdiction because the property was within a 
“dependent Indian community” as defined by a non-environmental criminal 
law governing crimes committed in Indian country.
126
 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Scherer v. U.S. Forest Serv., 653 F.3d 1241, 1242 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1245.  
 117. Id. (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. at 1242 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(2)). 
 119. Id. at 1243.  
 120. Id. at 1244.  
 121. Farber, supra note 71.  
 122. Scherer, 653 F.3d at 1242. 
 123. Hydro Res. Inc. v. EPA, 608 F.3d 1131, 1134 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 124. See 42 U.S.C. § 300f. 
 125. Hydro Resources, 608 F.3d at 1134.  
 126. Id.  
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Gorsuch rejected the EPA’s position and found that the mine was not on 
property set aside as Indian land and was not under federal 
“superintendence.”127 He acknowledged the “checkerboard” pattern of the 
local area, much of which was Navajo tribal land, and noted that 
underground water sources “don’t follow neat land survey lines.”128 
However, the EPA’s own limit on its permitting authority, modeled on a 
criminal jurisdiction statute, “mandated the outcome,” he wrote.129 
Analysis. This opinion showcases how Gorsuch applies case precedent 
when faced with cases which are factually similar.  Interestingly, Gorsuch 
notes that Venetie, the Supreme Court case upon which his opinion relied, 
“complicates to some degree EPA’s efforts to regulate activities affecting 
underground water sources, which don’t follow neat land survey lines.”130 
Then, he seemingly slighted the administration because of their decision to 
adopt a criminal statute’s definition of “Indian lands” instead of 
promulgating their own.
131
 “Crimes, after all,” Gorsuch jokes, “usually 
occur on land, not in aquifers.”132  
4. United States v. Magnesium 
Illustration. The United States of America (“Government”) sued the 
Magnesium Corporation of America (“Corporation”), a magnesium 
producer, seeking an injunction and monetary penalties for violating the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), specifically its 
implementing regulations concerning disposal of mineral process wastes.
133
 
Corporation argued that the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) had 
previously exempted the waste products in question from RCRA and as 
such, Corporation was not in violation.
134
 The United States District Court 
of Utah entered judgment in favor of Corporation and Government 
appealed.
135
 Writing for the Tenth Circuit majority, Gorsuch reversed and 
remanded the lower court’s decision, reasoning that because the EPA never 
previously adopted a definitive interpretation of the regulation, it remained 
free, even under the legal precedents on which Corporation seeks to rely, to 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. (citing Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520 (1998)). 
 128. Id. at 1166.  
 129. Id. at 1157.  
 130. Id. at 1166.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. United States v. Magnesium Corp. of America, 616 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2010).  
 134. Id. at 1130–31.  
 135. Id. at 1131.  
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change its opinion and issue a new interpretation without providing notice 
or time for comment.
136
  
Corporation mines and processes magnesium, using what the 
Corporation refers to as the “anhydrous” process.137 This process creates 
dangerous wastes which Corporation attempts to curtail through various 
pollution-control measures.
138
 Sometimes a preventive measure will create 
waste in its own right—wastes that provide the foundation for the 
Government’s cause of action.139 
Subtitle C of RCRA requires the EPA to promulgate regulations for the 
transportation, treatment, and disposal of hazardous wastes.
140
 In 1978, 
EPA proposed regulations for implementing Subtitle C for notice and 
comment.
141
 At first, some of these regulations were more stringent than 
others, based upon whether the wastes in question were relatively “high” or 
“low” in health risks.142 However, in 1980, and after proposing its rule and 
receiving public comment, EPA reversed course and created a uniform 
regulation without regards to a “level” of risk associated with the wastes 
under this Subtitle.
143
 “After various regulatory investigations and 
following more notice an comment, EPA issued a new rule in []1989.”144 
This finalized the criteria a waste must meet to qualify for exemption from 
Subtitle C.
145
 Applying this new criterion, EPA stated that “process 
wastewater from primary magnesium production by the anhydrous 
process—the category of waste at issue in this case,” were wastes likely to 
qualify for the exemption carved from Subtitle C.
146
 A year later, EPA 
submitted its Report to Congress on Special Wastes from Mineral 
Processing,
147
 “tentatively” recommending the exclusion of many wastes, 
including the waste at issue.
148
 In 1991, EPA, after considering comments 
on the Report, issued its final determination and rule (“Final Rule”) 
confirming that the waste did, in fact, qualify for exemption from Subtitle C 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id. at 1131.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. at 1131–32; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939(f).  
 141. Magnesium Corp., 616 F.3d at 1132. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at 1133.  
 146. Id. (citation omitted). 
 147. Id; see 55 FED.REG. 32,135 (1990). 
 148. Magnesium Corp., 616 F.3d at 1133. 
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and should be subjected to less stringent regulations under Subtitle D.
149
 
Although in doing so, EPA did not interpret the phrase “process wastewater 
from primary magnesium processing by the anhydrous process.”150 Soon 
after, EPA, Corporation, and the State of Utah began debating what the 
phrase actually encompassed.
151
 Corporation, unsurprisingly, opined that 
the Final Rule exempted all of the wastes produced by their facility from 
Subtitle C while EPA argued that only some of the wastes were 
exempted.
152
 This disagreement led to this suit in 2001.
153
 
 Before the district court, Government argued that five special wastes 
(collectively “Complaint Wastes”) did not qualify for exemption under 
Subtitle C because they were not “process wastewater from primary 
magnesium processing by the anhydrous process,” as required by the Final 
Rule.
154
 Four of the five Complaint Wastes, the Government urged, were 
not “process wastewater from primary magnesium processing,” they were, 
instead, “process wastewater from the processing of something else.”155 The 
fifth complaint waste did not qualify as a “wastewater” as it was a dry 
anode dust, according to the Government and it was instead a non-exempt 
solid waste.
156
 Corporation, on the other hand, relied heavily on EPA’s 
1990 interpretation and particular language from the Final Rule, alleging 
that all of the Complaint Wastes, at least at that time and under the Final 
Rule, were exempt.
157
 Furthermore, Government and EPA were bringing 
this lawsuit in conflict of “its prior interpretation—at least without first 
engaging in a period of public notice an comment.”158 This, Corporation 
urged, could not be done by principles of administrative law.
159
 The district 
court subsequently held for Corporation, reasoning that EPA’s current 
interpretation—that not all five Complaint Wastes were exempted—was 
inconsistent with the interpretation previously adopted, and that EPA could 
not now change its mind without first providing time for public notice and 
comment.
160
 The Government appealed.
161
 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 1133–34.  
 153. Id. at 1134.  
 154. Id.   
 155. Id.  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 1135.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/8
2018] Neil Gorsuch: On Energy & Environmental Law 1511 
 
 
Justice Gorsuch writing for the majority began by distinguishing the 
issue before the court, specifically by detailing what the parties have agreed 
upon.
162
 The parties stipulated that the Final Rule is ambiguous (not self-
defining), that the EPA’s current interpretation that excludes all of the 
Complaint Wastes is “plausible,” and that an agency’s own interpretation of 
an ambiguous rule is typically given deference under Auer v. Robbins.
163164
 
Thus leaving only one question to be decided: “[c]an EPA change its 
original interpretation of the regulation without following the notice and 
comment procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”)?”165  
The Tenth Circuit agreed with EPA in that the initial interpretation it 
offered in its Final Rule was a tentative one, and as such, the EPA need not 
comply with the APA regarding the requirements for public comment and 
notice.
166
 The court considered holdings from the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA167 and Paralyzed Veterans 
of America v. D.C. Arena L.P.,
168
 which held that the APA requires 
agencies to provide notice and comment when significantly revising a 
definitive interpretation of its own regulation.
169
 The court also pointed out 
that this issue is the subject of a circuit split, with the Third, Fifth, and Sixth 
Circuits adopting the D.C. Circuits’ view and the First and Ninth taking the 
contrary position.
170
 Instead of looking to APA § 551(5) for the answer as 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. at 1136. 
 163. 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
 164. Magnesium Corp., 616 F.3d at 1136. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. at 1138; see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (section 553’s notice and comment rulemaking 
procedures control but are distinct from formal (or on the record) rulemaking procedures 
governed by § 556).  
 167. 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that an agency could not 
“significantly revise” its previous “definitive interpretation of its own regulations without 
first engaging in “notice and comment”). 
 168. 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
 169. Magnesium Corp., 616 F.3d at 1138.   
 170. Id. Compare SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 498 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]f an agency’s 
present interpretation of a regulation is a fundamental modification of a previous 
interpretation, the modification can only be made in accordance with the notice and 
comment requirements of the APA.”), Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 629 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (“[T]he APA requires an agency to provide an opportunity for notice and 
comment before substantially altering a well established regulatory interpretation.”), and 
Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 682 (6th Cir. 2005) (“It is true 
that once an agency gives a regulation an interpretation, notice and comment will often be 
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the D.C. Circuit did, the court looked instead at § 553, which clearly states 
that the notice and comment requirements don’t apply to interpretive 
rules.
171
 This fact, the court stated, was missed in error by the Alaska 
Hunters court.
172
 As it followed, the court disagreed with Corporation that 
Alaska Hunters was supportive of their contention.
173
 Specifically, the court 
noted that even if the Alaska Hunters decision was appropriately decided, 
its precedent is unsupportive because the interpretation at issue in this case 
was merely tentative not definitive as stated in Alaska Hunters.
174
 “Even 
under the Alaska Hunters doctrine” the court noted, “before an agency 
adopts a definitive interpretation of its own rule it remains free to hear new 
arguments, make adjustments, and change directions all without having to 
undergo notice and comment.”175 Before concluding, Gorsuch involved the 
constitution, stating that “even if Congress repealed the APA tomorrow, the 
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would still 
prohibit the imposition of penalties without fair notice.”176 This pertains 
when an agency advances its own interpretation during a civil proceeding, 
however, Gorsuch noted, this potentially interesting argument was waived 
because Corporation failed to raise it during argument.
177
 In sum, the court 
held that because the EPA had not previously adopted a definitive 
interpretation of its 1991 rule, and even under the case law that Corporation 
urges the court to follow, EPA is at liberty to adopt without notice and 
comment a reasonable interpretation of that ambiguous regulation.
178
 
Accordingly, the district court’s judgment was vacated and remanded.179 
Analysis. Many of Gorsuch’s critics complain about his tendency to 
discuss in his opinions the legal arguments that were not presented at trial. 
This opinion does just that. He seems to be using the case as a teaching 
lesson instead of getting straight down to business. However, this tendency 
                                                                                                                 
required before the interpretation of that regulation can be changed.” (emphasis omitted)), 
with Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 81–82 (1st Cir. 1998), and Erringer v. Thompson, 371 
F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[N]o notice and comment rulemaking is required to amend a 
previous interpretive rule.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 171. Magnesium Corp., 616 F.3d at 1139; see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).  
 172. Magnesium Corp., 616 F.3d at 1140.  
 173. Id. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. at 1141.  
 176. Id. at 1144. 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. at 1145. 
 179. Id.  
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may be useful to him as a Justice, as his opinions will be studied and 
referenced as binding precedent across the land. 
A pro-agency part of this opinion is captured when Gorsuch made 
considerable effort to decide the case on narrow grounds. Instead of 
analyzing the argument presented by the Corporation, that the EPA must go 
through a public rulemaking procedure, he concluded that the earlier EPA 
interpretation was only tentative. In this way, he did not have to answer the 
tough question or make law before it was necessary to do so. 
5. Backcountry Hunters v. U.S. Forest Service 
Illustration. Sportsmen advocacy organization (“Organization”) brought 
action against the United States Forest Service (“Service”), challenging a 
temporary order which permitted motorcycles, but not other motorized 
vehicles, to use specific trails in a national forest.
180
 The United States 
District Court for the District of Colorado entered judgment for the Service 
and Organization appealed.
181
 Gorsuch, writing for the majority, held that 
Organization had no standing to sue, stating that “to show standing to sue in 
federal court you have to show that it’s likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative that you’ve suffered an injury that can be redressed by a 
favorable decision.”182 Because a victory for Organization in this case 
would do nothing to help their cause of action, in fact, it would only hurt it; 
they have no standing.
183
 
Analysis. This case is important as it illustrates Gorsuch’s position on the 
modern standing doctrine which Justice Scalia championed while on the 
bench. Standing is crucial to environmental groups which want to challenge 
a law or regulation in federal court. Without standing, they cannot be heard. 
This case should be encouraging to them as Gorsuch does not appear eager 
to dismiss plaintiffs for lack of standing, much unlike his predecessor was. 
He is “sympathetic to outdoor enthusiasts, even when ruling against them, 
and shows his Colorado roots in his writings.”184  
  
                                                                                                                 
 180. Backcountry Hunters & Anglers v. U.S. Forest Serv., 612 Fed. App’x 934, 935 
(10th Cir. 2015). 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 936. 
 183. Id.  
 184. Holbrook Mohr & Garance Burke, Gorsuch Willing to Limit Environmental Groups 
in Land Cases, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 5, 2017, 8:01 AM), https://www.usnews.com/ news/best-
states/colorado/articles/2017-03-05/gorsuch-willing-to-limit-environmental-groups-in-land-
cases.  
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6. George v. United States 
Illustration. An Individual bought New Mexico property in 2005 from a 
man who received it in a 1979 land exchange with the federal government, 
which reserved an easement across the property to access the Gila National 
Forest.
185
 After the Forest Service repeatedly removed the plaintiff’s fences, 
she sued under the Quiet Title Act
186
 which waives federal sovereign 
immunity to allow claims seeking “to adjudicate a disputed title to real 
property in which the United States claims an interest.”187 
Writing for the Tenth Circuit, Gorsuch affirmed the U.S. District Court 
for the District of New Mexico’s ruling that the suit was time-barred 
because the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year limitations period began to run when 
the previous owner executed the land swap with the Forest Service. 
“Whatever legal entitlement she might have had to build a fence across the 
Forest Service’s road she lost years ago thanks to an even less permeable 
barrier to entry: the statute of limitations,” he wrote.188 
Analysis. Simply, this case showcases Gorsuch’s fun, almost humorous 
style of writing. He can take a boring procedural question and make it 
enjoyable to read.  
7. Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
Illustration. Environmental group sued the Fish and Wildlife Service 
(“FWS”), arguing that that their decision to reintroduce a captive-bred 
experimental population of endangered falcons into New Mexico violated 
the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) because it does not comply 
with the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) or the National Environmental 
Policy Act (“NEPA”). 189 The United States District Court for the District of 
New Mexico ruled for FWS, and Environmental group appealed.
 190
  
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision to uphold the 
rule, saying the FWS had reasonably interpreted the definition of 
“population” under the Endangered Species Act and had not “pre-decided” 
its NEPA environmental analysis.
191
 
                                                                                                                 
 185. George v. United States, 672 F.3d 942, 943 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 186. Id. at 944; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2409a. 
 187. George, 672 F.3d at 944. 
 188. Id. at 943.  
 189. Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 611 F.3d 692 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. at 702–03.  
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After the conclusion and affirmation, Gorsuch writes, “I am pleased to 
concur in the court’s opinion . . . [and] note only two minor points.”192 First, 
he disagrees with the manner by which the majority reached its conclusion, 
stating that the court should not have “look[ed] beyond the four corners of 
the Fish and Wildlife Service’s environmental assessment . . . .”193 Second, 
Gorsuch disagreed with the majority’s analysis of two precedents, wherein, 
according to the majority, the court rejected an evidentiary approach to 
cases like this one.
194
 “As it happens,” Gorsuch illuminates,  these 
precedents “did not analyze or resolve the question.”195 Put simply, the 
majority reached when it interpreted the prior holdings, and Gorsuch was 
unashamed to bring it to everyone’s attention.  
Analysis. This case serves as another example of Gorsuch’s ability to 
write without shame when he feels his colleagues have overstepped their 
judicial authority or when they have employed an erroneous technique for 
solving legal questions. In this regard, he reflects Justice Scalia, one who is 
infamously known for writing fiery dissents against the other members of 
the bench.  
III. Gorsuch v. Scalia—On Chevron and Standing 
Gorsuch was midway down a ski slope in Colorado two years ago when 
he found out Antonin Scalia was dead.
196
 “I immediately lost what breath I 
had left,” he said in a speech two months later, “[a]nd I am not embarrassed 
to admit that I couldn’t see the rest of the way down the mountain for the 
tears.”197 His regard for the late Justice is unquestioned, and their friendship 
is something almost all Supreme Court watchers know. But it is not because 
of this fondness that President Trump decided to appoint the Coloradan; 
that credit is due to the approach they take when facing questions of law.
198
 
The “great Justice Antonin Scalia was in my mind throughout the decision 
making process,” Trump explained when asked how he decided to appoint 
Gorsuch.
199
 And if the President’s goal was to replace Scalia with someone 
with similar style, he brought in the right guy. Similar they may be, there 
are critical differences between them which are the focus of this section. 
                                                                                                                 
 192. Id. at 719 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
 193. Id.  
 194. Id.  
 195. Id.  
 196. Liptak, supra note 44. 
 197. Id. 
 198. de Vogue, supra note 47. 
 199. Id. 
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A. On Chevron 
The Chevron doctrine comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chevron v. NRDC
200
 wherein the Court held that if a statute is ambiguous 
on a particular issue, a court should defer to any reasonable interpretation 
properly promulgated by the statute’s implementing agency.201 The theory 
behind the doctrine is generally that “Congress intended to leave things up 
to the agency when it left gaps in a statute,” as agencies are in the best 
position to fill those gaps because of their technical expertise.
202
 Gorsuch, 
unlike his predecessor, is strikingly opposed to the doctrine, even going so 
far as to author a concurrence to his own majority opinion in order to 
skewer the concept.
203
 In that case, he wrote:   
There’s an elephant in the room with us today. We have 
studiously attempted to work our way around it and even left it 
unremarked. But the fact is Chevron . . . permit[s] executive 
bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and 
legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that 
seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution 
of the framers’ design. Maybe the time has come to face the 
behemoth.
204
 
Gorsuch argued that Chevron allows “trampling [of] the constitutional 
design” by allowing executive agencies to overrule a judicial declaration 
without the legislative process prescribed by the constitution.
205
  
By contrast, Scalia was a supporter of Chevron.
206
 Even though he 
applied it in his own conservative way and bashed the prior decisions 
leading up to the holding, he upheld the doctrine on several occasions and 
never hinted that it should be done away with.
207
 This view of 
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administrative law is perhaps the biggest difference between the two 
Justices and has environmentalists nervous.
208
  
Without Chevron to give deference to agency interpretations, their ability 
to apply statutory directives in a way that ensures enforcement powers is 
significantly impacted.
209
 This, and the fact that the Trump administration is 
set to disembowel the Clean Power Plan (directive created during the 
Obama presidency), foreshadows a vital role Gorsuch will face as the 
pending litigation makes its way to the Supreme Court. With that said, 
Gorsuch maintains that even without Chevron, the courts “could and 
would . . . apply the agency’s interpretation when it accords with the best 
reading of the statute.”210 
B. On Standing 
Access to the courts is an essential and uniquely significant issue for 
environmental law.
211
 Particularly, “the doctrine of standing is used to 
decide whether or not a plaintiff is asserting the type of ‘case or 
controversy’” which affords them the opportunity to come before an Article 
III, federal judiciary.
212
 Scalia promoted the modern standing doctrine 
which was often a fatal flaw to environmental groups seeking access to the 
courts.
213
  
In 2005, before becoming a Tenth Circuit judge, Gorsuch wrote an essay 
published in National Review criticizing liberals for turning to the courts to 
achieve their policy goals rather than their legislatures.
214
 He wrote: 
“American liberals have become addicted to the courtroom, relying on 
judges and lawyers rather than elected leaders and the ballot box . . . .”215 
This attitude he shares with Scalia, though unlike his predecessor, has not 
surfaced in his jurisprudence. That is, Gorsuch does not seem quite as eager 
to use standing as a fatal flaw in litigation.
216
 In Cook v. Rockwell Int’l, 
Gorsuch found standing for an owner of a state permit because the owner 
had already paid for it and would have had to jump through similar hoops to 
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obtain a required federal permit.
217
 In Backcountry Hunters & Anglers v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., however, he held that a group opposed to motorized 
vehicles in a park could not object to a regulation which would allow them 
to enter because doing so would actually leave a less-restrictive regulation 
in place and thus the group had no standing, or better put, no “case or 
controversy.”218 The importance of these cases shows that Gorsuch is not 
interested in using the modern standing doctrine as Scalia did.   
What does this mean for the industry? If Gorsuch mirrors Scalia and 
brings to the court a narrow approach on standing issues, it could mean that 
environmental organizations, flush with donations after the withdrawal 
from the Paris Accord and increased efforts at deregulation, would have a 
harder time getting their cases heard in federal court. However, if Gorsuch 
continues to demonstrate a more nuanced approach to these issues, relying 
on case precedent and the law first before sending plaintiffs away for lack 
of standing, courts will become more accessible.  
IV. Conclusion 
Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Westerner with a degree from Oxford, the 
natural law theorist and black diamond skier, is eccentric, electric, and 
downright brilliant. His presence on the Court to most represents the perfect 
replacement of the late Justice Antonin Scalia. In many ways, he is. Not 
merely because their philosophies, for the most part, align, but because of 
his passion for the law and for justice and for everything that a judge stands 
for.  
Gorsuch’s textualist approach to solving legal questions can no longer be 
seen as a predictor of traditionally conservative results.
219
 He is a Justice 
first, and conservative second. His handling of energy and environmental 
law cases depends wholly on the way the law is written and not how he 
believes the law should be. That said, his general disdain for the Chevron 
doctrine poses somewhat of a threat to agencies that want autonomy and 
reliance afforded to them. Further, his disinterest in standing could afford 
environmentalists more opportunity to have their day in court.  
As the Trump administration continues to cut regulatory authorities, back 
out on global climate plans, and reverse efforts made to cut down on carbon 
emissions, it is not unlikely that states will try to fill the void left with their 
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own rules and regulations. It is equally likely that interest groups will turn 
to litigation to try and keep the status quo. These are all areas in which 
Justice Gorsuch will have a determining voice, a voice which will 
ultimately shape the future of both industries. 
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